W. Bryan Hubbard did not come to ibogaine through a laboratory. He came to it through opioid policy. He was the first chair and executive director of Kentucky’s Opioid Abatement Advisory Commission, the body that allocates part of the state’s opioid settlement funds. He came to it from running the attorney general’s Office of Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Control, and before that he led the state’s Social Security disability and child support enforcement programs. In 2023 he led the commission through public hearings on whether to fund ibogaine research, a proposal reported at the time at $42 million. After a new attorney general took office in January 2024, the commission had a new chair, and the funding went no further.

He now leads Americans for Ibogaine, a 501(c)(3) charity chaired by former Texas governor Rick Perry that advocates for medical access to the drug. Ibogaine, an alkaloid from the root bark of the Central African iboga shrub, is used in clinics outside the United States to interrupt opioid withdrawal. It is a Schedule I substance in the United States, and FDA has approved no ibogaine product for any use. In his own words, Hubbard describes what persuaded him, where he draws the line between testimony and evidence, and where he believes the federal system has the risk wrong.

What persuaded him

Hubbard does not point to a study.

“I had a series of conversations with individuals who had received ibogaine treatment for opioid and poly-substance dependency as well as war-related trauma,” he said. “These individuals relayed miraculous recovery experiences which convinced me that ibogaine warranted serious consideration…”

He framed it as an additional option for people “who were not being effectively served by existing medications,” not a replacement for them.

The published record has the same shape as those conversations: striking, and uncontrolled. In a Mexico clinic study of 30 people with opioid dependence, published in 2018, half reported no opioid use in the previous 30 days one month after a single treatment; there was no comparison group. A New Zealand study followed 14 patients for a year, and only eight completed every interview; one patient enrolled in the study died during treatment. A survey of 88 people treated in Mexico found that 30 percent never used opioids again and 70 percent relapsed. For war-related trauma, the most cited study, published by Stanford researchers in Nature Medicine in 2024, followed 30 special-operations veterans with mostly mild traumatic brain injury who arranged treatment themselves at a clinic in Mexico. Their disability, PTSD and depression scores fell sharply a month later. The study had no control group, the participants also received other support around the dose, and three of the authors were affiliated with the clinic.

Testimony is not validation, and he says so

“Because vigorous clinical research has been legally prohibitive due to the impact of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, the only evidence to inform public discussion of ibogaine’s potential comes from those who have experienced the treatment,” Hubbard said. “Most of the individuals who discuss their treatment experiences have had positive outcomes and represent a variety of physiological and psychological conditions. Drawing the line between individual experiences, however numerous, and broad therapeutic claims rests on an acknowledgment that individual treatment outcomes must be replicated within the context of vigorous clinical research trials in order to scientifically validate ibogaine’s therapeutic potential.”

The last sentence is the line he holds: experience, however much of it, is not validation.

The first sentence needs two qualifications. The Controlled Substances Act burdens Schedule I research without forbidding it: a researcher needs a DEA registration, and HHS reviews the protocol, and a 2025 amendment shortened that process for studies under an investigational new drug application or with federal funding. And patient accounts are not the only evidence. Prospective, monitored clinical research has been conducted, mostly outside the United States. A Dutch hospital study published in 2022 gave 14 patients with opioid use disorder a single 10 mg/kg dose under cardiac monitoring. Two randomized trials have also been completed, a placebo-controlled study in the UK sponsored by atai Therapeutics (atai has since combined with Beckley Psytech as AtaiBeckley, which Eli Lilly acquired in September 2026), and a dose-comparison trial in Spain. Neither has published its results, so no randomized efficacy data for ibogaine in opioid use disorder are yet in the peer-reviewed record.

His observation that most people who speak publicly about treatment did well is also a reason for the caution he endorses. The people most likely to describe a treatment are the ones for whom it worked. Replication is how a field finds out what happened to everyone else.

Safety first, and one safeguard FDA has not proposed

“Comprehensive pre-treatment health screening is non-negotiable,” Hubbard said.

His list covers cardiac evaluation for arrhythmia risk; mental health screening for disqualifying disorders; blood and urine testing to establish what substances a person has taken before treatment; integration support before and after; and, for people with opioid use disorder, an injection of extended-release naltrexone after treatment to block opioids if they relapse.

“The delivery of effective post-therapeutic support to bolster treatment efficacy while mitigating the possibility of relapse fatalities during Phases II and III by administering injectable naltrexone need to be addressed prior to the commencement of Phase II,” he said.

Most of the list overlaps with FDA’s own preliminary thinking. In an October 6 request for information on early-phase ibogaine trials, the agency described excluding people with structural heart disease, a personal or family history of arrhythmia, a history of seizures, psychosis, bipolar disorder or recent suicidal thoughts; excluding anyone whose baseline QTcF is 430 milliseconds or more; genotyping participants for CYP2D6, the enzyme that converts ibogaine to its active metabolite; and dosing in an inpatient unit equipped to treat a life-threatening arrhythmia, with monitoring that could last 36 hours.

Naltrexone is where he goes past the agency. FDA’s notice says participants with opioid use disorder should stop methadone or buprenorphine before dosing, and then asks the public what measures would best manage “risks from loss of opioid tolerance.” It proposes none. Hubbard’s answer addresses that gap, and the risk behind it is documented: the label for extended-release naltrexone warns that patients are likely to have reduced tolerance after detoxification, which raises the danger of a fatal overdose on relapse.

What is missing is evidence for the sequence he proposes. The same label calls for 7 to 10 days without opioids before the first injection, and starting naltrexone after detoxification is hard even in conventional care: in one randomized comparison, 56 percent of patients on a naltrexone-assisted protocol received the injection. No published study has tested ibogaine followed by extended-release naltrexone. The one registered trial that pairs the two drugs, not yet recruiting, compares them head to head.

Where he parts with FDA

Hubbard credits the agency’s system with “exacting standards for the assessment of clinical safety and efficacy.” His objection is to how it weighs ibogaine’s effect on the heart. FDA’s caution about cardiac risk, he said, has been “historically blinkered” by an unwillingness to consider evidence from offshore clinics he describes as having “sound safety records.”

“FDA’s inflexible metrics for an acceptable range of QT prolongation constitute a regulatory reality which should yield to demonstrated administration reality which suggest that ibogaine’s prolongation of the QT interval beyond FDA’s regulatory threshold can be safely managed through the co-administration of magnesium,” he said. “In other words, regulatory reality can sometimes impede the emergence of legitimate objective reality as manifest in real-world circumstances.”

This is his sharpest claim, and the agency’s own notice is the place to test it.

FDA does not ignore overseas experience. The request for information says its preliminary thinking drew on ibogaine administration in settings outside the United States, and it asks what would make that data useful, naming individual-level pharmacokinetic, electrocardiographic and product information. Its complaint is about quality: most published ibogaine studies, it says, lack participant-level data and adequate characterization of the product given.

The metrics are less fixed than his description suggests. The notice says the 500-millisecond discontinuation threshold is most applicable to drugs taken every day, because it exists mainly to stop further exposure outside a hospital. Ibogaine is usually given once or occasionally, and because torsades occurs in a minority of patients above that line and can be treated, the notice calls it “conceivable” that the balance of benefit and risk of even repeat dosing “could still be favorable” in an intensively monitored setting. Its preliminary design would pause a trial for review if a participant’s QTc stayed above 500 milliseconds for more than two days, not the moment it crossed.

Magnesium is already on the agency’s list. The notice says sponsors could study whether intravenous magnesium pretreatment reduces QTc prolongation, and asks how to design a trial that separates ibogaine alone from ibogaine with magnesium. What the record does not yet contain is that comparison. The Stanford veterans study gave intravenous magnesium before and after dosing and reported no clinically meaningful QT prolongation, which it defined as prolongation “qualitatively detectable on monitoring.” QTc was watched visually on a five-lead monitor, no measured values were published, and people with any history of heart problems were excluded. In the Dutch study, which gave no magnesium beforehand, 7 of 14 patients exceeded 500 milliseconds, and magnesium was given as a rescue after they did. Neither study had torsades de pointes, the arrhythmia that makes QT prolongation dangerous. In cardiology, intravenous magnesium is the standard treatment for torsades, and in the classic study of that use it stopped the arrhythmia without significantly changing the QT interval. Making a dangerous rhythm less likely and keeping QTc in range are different claims, and the second is the one that has not been tested.

The clinics’ records are harder to assess than his phrase implies, because there is no registry and no required reporting. A forensic review counted 19 deaths associated with ibogaine between 1990 and 2008; in 12 of the 14 cases with adequate autopsy data, preexisting illness, mostly cardiovascular, or other drugs explained or contributed to the death. A 2026 preprint, not yet peer-reviewed, collected self-reported data from 11 clinics covering 19,071 patients and found six deaths within 72 hours of treatment, about one in 1,730 among patients treated for opioid use disorder and none among the others; its authors call the figure a lower bound, and one of them holds equity in a treatment clinic.

Federal money is now going toward part of that gap. Among the ARPA-H awards HHS announced on November 12, Beond, which runs an ibogaine treatment center in Cancún, is to provide a de-identified dataset from 250 patients that, the company says, includes ECG data and adverse events and will be analyzed independently by ARPA-H, its research collaborators and FDA. A separate team led by Mark Cuban Cost Plus Drug Company is to build the regulatory and manufacturing foundation for a domestically made, single-molecule ibogaine hydrochloride product, the kind of characterized drug FDA says most published studies lacked. Beond’s dataset moves part of the overseas record Hubbard points to toward the participant-level form FDA asked for, and the Cost Plus work addresses the product characterization FDA found missing. They do not show that the record supports relaxing cardiac limits. The dataset comes from one clinic and has not yet been analyzed, and HHS says the awards fund no treatment of patients or human-subject research and do not authorize trials. The same announcement calls ibogaine’s heart rhythm risk potentially life-threatening and says future studies must address cardiac monitoring.

Hubbard and FDA agree that overseas experience is relevant and that magnesium is worth testing. They disagree on whether the existing record is strong enough to relax cardiac limits before a trial produces participant-level data.

Access is not infrastructure

Federal policy now points toward earlier access. Executive Order 14401, signed April 18, directs FDA and DEA to “facilitate and establish a pathway” for eligible patients to receive psychedelic drugs, including ibogaine compounds, under the federal Right to Try Act. Hubbard’s answer puts the order of operations elsewhere.

“Concrete clinical standards for the safe and effective administration of ibogaine treatment for OUD must be firmly established within the FDA drug development process,” he said. Once they are, policymakers should expedite training and certification for clinicians who want to provide it.

“Establishing local, state, and national treatment delivery infrastructure is a herculean endeavor which will require years to operationalize.”

— W. Bryan Hubbard

“Setting clinical standards, curation of the clinical workforce, and the creation of a low-barrier, cost-efficient treatment model which prevents the capture of treatment delivery infrastructure by regionalized healthcare delivery monopolies must receive co-equal deliberative engagement from policy makers,” he continued. “The emergence of an operational reality of ibogaine treatment access, certainly at scale, is very likely to lag the legal reality of Federal Right to Try access for some time.”

The legal route is narrower than the order’s language. The Right to Try Act covers drugs that have completed a Phase 1 trial and are in active development under an investigational new drug application, and it is limited to patients with a life-threatening condition who have exhausted approved options. No ibogaine product in the public record is in that position in the United States, and whether opioid use disorder qualifies as life-threatening under the law has not been tested.

FDA’s preliminary design shows how concrete his infrastructure problem is. The inpatient unit it describes for a first trial would likely include continuous heart rhythm monitoring, a physician-led team trained in advanced cardiac life support, a bedside defibrillator, emergency pacing and ventilator support. If anything like that standard carried into routine care, ibogaine would be delivered in hospitals with cardiac units, the setting least likely to produce the low-barrier, low-cost model he is asking for.

Why opioid use disorder comes first

“OUD is the single most lethal and costly ongoing public health epidemic in America,” Hubbard said. “Ibogaine represents one of the best opportunities in the history of the epidemic to improve treatment outcomes at scale.”

The burden he describes is very large; the ranking is harder to support. CDC’s provisional data predict about 40,750 opioid-involved overdose deaths in the 12 months ending June 2026, a figure that has been falling, against more than 480,000 deaths a year CDC attributes to cigarette smoking and secondhand smoke and about 178,000 to excessive alcohol use. A CDC-authored estimate put the cost of opioid use disorder and fatal overdose at $1.02 trillion in 2017, but that figure assigns a dollar value to lives lost, and published tobacco and alcohol estimates use different methods, so the numbers do not produce a clean ranking. What they do establish is a burden counted in tens of thousands of deaths and roughly a trillion dollars a year. Whether ibogaine is one of the field’s best opportunities is the question the trials exist to answer.

Opioid use disorder is also where ibogaine is hardest to test safely. FDA’s design would take participants off methadone or buprenorphine, medications that lower the risk of death, before a single investigational dose. All six deaths in the clinic preprint occurred among patients treated for opioid use disorder. The indication with the greatest need carries the most difficult trial.

“Because ibogaine is no longer patentable as a treatment for OUD, the necessity of delivering focused public and philanthropic funding for OUD is self-evident,” Hubbard said.

The core of that is accurate. Ibogaine occurs in nature, and Howard Lotsof’s 1985 patent on using it to treat heroin addiction has long expired. Narrower protection remains possible: patents on formulations, dosing regimens and new analogs are still being granted, including a 2026 patent on deuterated ibogaine analogs, and a first approval of the active ingredient would carry FDA marketing exclusivity. The incentive gap is widest for plain ibogaine, which is the drug public programs are funding. Texas committed $50 million in 2025, and the state awarded it to a consortium led by UTHealth Houston with UTMB; no Texas trial is yet registered. Mississippi enacted its own trial law in March. ARPA-H’s first ibogaine awards, announced November 12, are aimed at PTSD rather than opioid use disorder, and fund groundwork (drug supply, manufacturing, existing clinic data and preparation for an investigational application) rather than trials. So far, then, the federal program has not followed the order of priority Hubbard argues for, though HHS describes a strategy of pursuing more than one indication at once and says additional awards will focus on substance use disorders, including opioid use disorder. ARPA-H’s opioid-specific program, which solicited proposals for Phase 1/2 trials, is accepting submissions only from applicants already in its process and has announced no awards.

“I hope the current federal/multi-state/multi-tribal partnership will consider the pursuit of a basket trial model so that multiple clinical indications can be tackled within a single trial,” he said.

No trial matching that description appears in ClinicalTrials.gov. The design he names exists: FDA’s draft guidance on master protocols defines a basket trial as one that evaluates a drug across multiple diseases or conditions. FDA’s ibogaine notice treats opioid use disorder and PTSD as separate study populations with different entry criteria under a shared exclusion list, and stopping opioid agonist medication matters only for the first. A basket trial would have to carry both populations’ rules under one protocol.

The question he wants imaging to answer

“Does ibogaine have an objectively identifiable regenerative effect on the brain?” Hubbard asked. “Or, does ibogaine re-wire the brain’s existing circuitry so that it has the capacity to circumvent damaged cells/structures/areas thereby enabling the brain to re-gain functional capacity? Comprehensive neural imaging which accurately reveals ibogaine’s capacity to either restore or re-wire the brain would help all of us understand the exact nature of its potential and how best to leverage it across relevant conditions.”

Both possibilities remain open, and so does a third: that neither occurs in a way that lasts. In rats, ibogaine reduced alcohol intake through GDNF, a growth factor that supports neurons. In people, the evidence comes from the same 30 Stanford veterans: follow-up papers report EEG changes and increases in cortical thickness on MRI, which the authors call consistent with neuroplastic change while cautioning that the scans are sensitive to nonstructural effects. No study has shown neurogenesis or tissue repair in humans. The brain question also runs the other way. FDA’s notice cites animal studies in which ibogaine injured the brain, including the cerebellum, and every patient in the Dutch study developed temporary severe ataxia. Imaging that could show restoration would also have to rule out harm, and showing that a change causes recovery would take controlled, longitudinal studies, not scans of treated patients alone.

Each of Hubbard’s strongest claims, about magnesium, about the clinics’ safety records, and about what ibogaine does to the brain, is a claim the trials he calls for are built to test.