Public comment is the formal route by which patients, caregivers and clinicians reach an FDA advisory committee. A study published November 7 in Therapeutic Innovation and Regulatory Science puts a number on what travels down it. Of 600 randomly sampled comments across the five most-commented drug and biologic applications reviewed between January 2020 and December 2024, 90.2 percent supported approval, 7.8 percent were neutral and 1.3 percent opposed. The abstract does not account for the remaining 0.7 percent; the coding framework in the supplement includes an “unrelated” category. Caregivers and immediate family wrote 31.5 percent of them, patients 17.2 percent.
The six authors, all at Johns Hopkins, conclude that stronger mechanisms for synthesizing public input could improve transparency and confidence in the process. The more interesting question sits one step behind that recommendation: what does this channel currently connect to?
The paper sits behind a subscription. Its supplementary material does not, and for this question the supplement is the better document. It lists the 44 advisory committee reviews the authors drew from, each with its comment count and its vote record; the ALS entry covers two meetings. That table supports a test the paper does not run.
Volume does not sort the outcomes
Rank those 44 entries by how many public comments they drew. Setting aside poziotinib, whose 236 comments include comments for other products, four of the eight that drew the most produced negative committee votes, counting the ALS product by its first vote; with poziotinib the count is five. Among the eight that drew the fewest, three or four did, depending on how a four-way tie at two comments is cut. The most-commented product in the dataset, sodium phenylbutyrate and taurursodiol for ALS with 1,296 comments, drew a negative vote at its first meeting. Three products drew no comments at all and split two favorable, one not.
This is a descriptive observation across a small set, not a statistical test, and it carries no causal claim in either direction. High public engagement did not map onto favorable committee outcomes in any consistent way.
Four things are worth keeping apart here, because they are routinely collapsed: how many comments a review attracts, what those comments say, how the committee votes, and what FDA then does. The study measures the second. The supplement supplies the first and third. FDA’s own documents supply the fourth, and they are where the reasoning lives.
The five cases
Three corrections to the supplement’s own table are needed first. Delandistrogene moxeparvovec was reviewed by the Cellular, Tissue, and Gene Therapies Advisory Committee, not the Peripheral and Central Nervous System committee the appendix names. The March 2022 ALS entry is annotated as a vote to convene another meeting; the committee was asked one question, about effectiveness, and lost it. And the midomafetamine entry lists one tally where there were two.
That last point generalizes: a bare pair of numbers does not say which way a committee went. FDA’s own documents print the same vote in different orders: the Relyvrio summary review gives the March ALS vote as 6 to 4 in one place and as 6 no, 4 yes in another. Votes below are labeled.
| Product (comments) | Committee vote, then FDA action | Documented basis |
|---|---|---|
| ALS, sodium phenylbutyrate and taurursodiol (1,296, then 474) | 4 for, 6 against on effectiveness; then 7 for, 2 against on approval. Approved Sep 29, 2022; withdrawn Aug 29, 2025 at the sponsor’s request | Primary endpoint met; post hoc survival analyses; stated flexibility |
| Teplizumab, type 1 diabetes (188) | 10 for, 7 against. Complete response Jul 2, 2021; approved Nov 17, 2022 | Product comparability and manufacturing deficiencies |
| Midomafetamine, PTSD (179) | 2 for, 9 against on effectiveness; 1 for, 10 against on benefit and risk. Complete response Aug 8, 2024; never approved | Safety-data reliability, durability past week 18, prior MDMA use |
| Delandistrogene moxeparvovec, DMD (171) | 8 for, 6 against. Accelerated approval Jun 22, 2023, ages 4 and 5; expanded Jun 2024 | Center Director decision over three review disciplines |
| Eflornithine, neuroblastoma (164) | 14 for, 6 against. Approved Dec 13, 2023 | Externally controlled trial, accepted with stated uncertainty |
Eflornithine, the fifth, is the plain case. The committee voted 14 to 6 that the evidence was sufficient to conclude it improves event-free survival, and FDA approved it on an externally controlled trial, noting the uncertainty that design carries.
Two cases where the deciding ground was not what the public addressed
Teplizumab is the cleanest. The Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee voted 10 for and 7 against on benefit and risk in May 2021. FDA’s clinical review records that the committee “unanimously acknowledged significant unmet need” and “acknowledged and credited the moving testimonials from patients and family members.” Five weeks later FDA issued a complete response letter. Its lead ground was that the commercial product was not shown to match the product that had been studied: a bridging study “failed to show PK comparability,” the commercial material delivering 51.5 percent less total exposure than the pivotal-trial material. The sponsor also said the letter noted manufacturing amendments FDA had not yet reviewed and inspection deficiencies at a fill and finish facility, and told investors it cited no clinical efficacy or safety deficiency. Teplizumab was approved in November 2022, about sixteen months after the letter, at a higher dose schedule.
Delandistrogene moxeparvovec runs the other way. The committee voted 8 for and 6 against, and FDA granted accelerated approval. But the Center Director’s memo records that the clinical, clinical pharmacology and statistical reviews all declined to recommend approval, and that he disagreed “with certain interpretations of the efficacy data.” A later memo from FDA’s Office of Clinical Evaluation is plainer.
“…accelerated approval was granted by Center Director override of the review team and senior CBER leadership recommendation.”
— FDA Office of Clinical Evaluation memorandum, 2024, describing the 2023 decision
Here the public channel is visible in the record, and it points toward approval, not away. The Center Director lists among the materials he reviewed “multiple scientific statements and video testimony submitted by the public to the docket,” and singles out that “several providers and family members testified at the open public hearing showing videos indicating apparent improvement.” His formal finding is that the data show an effect on a surrogate endpoint, micro-dystrophin expression, reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit in ages 4 through 5. He cites a 4.3-point against 1.9-point difference on the North Star Ambulatory Assessment that, he writes, “may not be sufficient on its own to demonstrate clinical benefit because of the sample size” but correlates with expression. The memo does not say the testimony decided anything, but it does show public submissions reaching the one person who overrode everyone else, and the items he names are supportive testimony and videos.
Two cases do not describe FDA generally. They establish that a decision can turn on material the public was never presented with, and that where public input does surface in a decision memo, it can surface on the approving side.
The ALS sequence
The ALS case is the one most often misread as public pressure working. In March 2022 the committee was asked whether the data established a conclusion of effectiveness and voted 6 to 4 that they did not. The sponsor then submitted new analyses, including two post hoc survival comparisons against external data, a major amendment that extended the review clock by three months.
FDA reconvened the same committee in September and changed the question. It no longer asked whether effectiveness was established; it asked whether the evidence was “sufficient to support approval,” and told members that “you may take into account in your vote the unmet need in ALS, the status of the ongoing Phase 3 trial, and the seriousness of ALS.” The vote came back 7 for, 2 against, and FDA approved three weeks later, applying what its summary review calls “an appropriately high degree of regulatory flexibility in the setting of the severity and unmet need in ALS.”
What changed between the two votes was the evidence on file and the question on the page. Comment volume fell by nearly two thirds between the meetings. The confirmatory trial failed in 2024, the sponsor stopped marketing the product, and at FDA’s request it asked for the approval to be withdrawn, which took effect in August 2025.
Midomafetamine as one case among five
In the midomafetamine complete response letter, public comments appear once. Behavioral Wire’s deep read of that letter covers it in detail; what matters here is where the comments sit in it.
The Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee voted 2 for and 9 against on effectiveness, and 1 for and 10 against on benefit and risk under FDA’s proposed risk management. FDA issued a complete response. Its three approvability deficiencies rest on the sponsor’s data and FDA’s own work: the reliability of the safety data, where a sponsor inspection found training materials defining an adverse event to exclude “positive or favorable effects,” contrary to the protocol, and FDA found unreported adverse events at study sites; no demonstration that the effect lasts beyond the 18-week end-of-study assessments; and prior MDMA use reported by about 40 percent of enrolled participants, which FDA set against its own analysis of national survey data showing lifetime use of 16.2 and 20.5 percent among people with moderate and severe mental illness.
Public comment enters once, in a recommendation, not a deficiency. FDA wrote that given the seriousness of the safety-data concerns, “and also acknowledging comments made during the open public hearing of the advisory committee and in the public docket raising concerns about study conduct and the adequacy of collection of adverse event information,” the sponsor should consider an independent third-party data audit. The wording matters. The comments corroborate a concern FDA had already established through inspection, and they are attached to something the agency recommends rather than requires. The committee’s votes are not cited anywhere in the letter.
What this evidence cannot settle
The limits are worth stating precisely. The 600 coded comments are a sample of the 2,472 the supplement counts across the five products, and the supplement gives no per-product allocation. ALS alone accounts for 71.6 percent of that pool, so the headline sentiment figure may be substantially an ALS figure. There is no per-product stance breakdown, no separation of oral testimony from written submissions, and no usable opposition count by product. The 1.3 percent opposed works out to roughly eight comments across all five reviews together, which cannot support a claim about any one of them.
Nor can any of this establish causation. There is no counterfactual for a regulatory decision. The honest reading is narrower and still useful: across the five reviews that drew the most public participation in five years, the volume and direction of that participation do not predict what the committees did, and FDA’s own documents attribute its actions to inspections, manufacturing data, durability evidence, post hoc analyses and internal disagreement.
For sponsors and advocacy organizations that treat comment mobilization as a lever on an advisory committee, that is the operative finding. The channel is real, it is read, and in one documented instance it reached a decision-maker who overruled his own staff. It is not visible in these records as a thing that moves votes.